Legal eye The writer is a lawyer based in Islamabad. PML-N
stalwarts declared immediately after the election that the ruling
party’s top three priorities would be the economy, the economy and the
economy. One hopes that two things are clear to thinking minds within
the party in this first month: that the economy cannot really blossom if
the country is suffering a reign of terror, and that perpetuation of
terror and crime is what the TTP and its syndicated subgroups do for a
living; they will not reconsider their ideology and politics or
undermine their financial interests and source of power because the new
governments in the centre and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa refuse to denounce them
outright. The government has decided to convene an All-Parties
Conference on terror. It will be a complete waste of time if the agenda
is limited to innocuously condemning terror, endorsing talks with
terrorists and passing other banal resolutions declaring respect for the
sovereignty of other states while asking them to reciprocate. Let this
be a two-part APC. The first part should be focused on helping the
politicos fully understand the nature of the cancer eating Pakistan up.
Once they know how things really are, then ask them to deliberate the
best way to curb terror and build public opinion behind the agreed
anti-terror framework. Let the army, the intelligence agencies and
civilian law-enforcement agencies give in-camera briefings to the
politicos and explain to them the horizontal, non-hierarchical
functioning of the TTP and how it has granted franchise to subgroups
engaging in crime and violence or entered into joint ventures with the
LeJs and LeTs where it is more suitable. If they still support talking
to the TTP as the best way to liquidate our terror network, ask them to
consider what will become of the crime and terror subgroups that have
presently been subsumed by the larger TTP brand but are functionally
autonomous and not under the TTP’s control. Today’s Pakistan is like
the nightmare where danger is approaching you fast but your body turns
numb and refuses to respond. Our misfortune is being stuck with a
national leadership – political, military and religious included – that
either doesn’t understand the sense of urgency that must attach to
rooting out terror or lacks the resolve and courage to take up such a
daunting challenge. But in the event that we were to wake up from this
nightmare and find our leaders willing to take responsibility for the
future of our state and society, here are a few things they might wish
to consider. As Austin explained, a sovereign is one who doesn’t
habitually obey the command of another within a given territory, while
others habitually obey his command within such territory. Now if
Pakistan is a sovereign state it cannot tolerate the existence of
sanctuaries where the TTP or other non-state actors don’t habitually
obey its command and have established their own writ. Once those living
within such sanctuary recognise that the command of the TTP, backed by
threat of sanction, is more potent than that of the state of Pakistan,
it is the end of Pakistan’s claim to sovereignty in relation to such
territory. The concept of territorial sovereignty is not just
theoretical. It is a functional necessity. First of all, there can be no
such thing as shared sovereignty, unless those sharing power respect
the legitimacy of the source distributing it. So for example, in a
federation, the federal and provincial governments share power. But such
power flows from the constitution, the legitimacy of which is
recognised by both. In the TTP’s case it is monopoly over use of force
within its sanctuary that forms the basis of its authority. As its
ability to inflict violence on the state of Pakistan increases, so will
its claim to additional territory. Second, unless Pakistan carves a
tribal agency as TTP-land and treats it like an autonomous state, the
flow of men, material and money back and forth will continue. Pakistan
will remain at the mercy of the TTP and its crime syndicate, which will
retain its ability to attack the Pakistani state and its citizens at
will. Let us understand that if we agree to talk to the TTP and the
talks succeed, what will change is not the ability of the TTP to attack
us, but only our presumption about its will to do so. Pakistan is a
big country. And in this age of terror and non-state actors, the
distinction between hard and soft targets has ceased to exist. You may
be able to protect the GHQ, air bases or VIPs with added layers of
security, but how will you protect every school, every state building,
every commercial complex, every residential compound, every policeman,
judge, prosecutor, every bus and every camping site? So long as there
remain non-state actors on our soil, whether motivated by an ideology of
bigotry and hate or employed as mercenaries by foreign enemies, the
problem of terror will remain alive with its bite. So here is the bad
news. If talks with the TTP happen and succeed, they will result into
nothing more than a temporary tenuous truce. The terror syndicate
functioning under the TTP umbrella is no hierarchical disciplined
organisation that will liquidate itself if Hakimullah Mehsud calls it a
day and Ehsanullah Ehsan announces such retirement from his undisclosed
location. The underlying radical ideology and political economy of
terror is such that if the present faces are won over by the state,
their more hard-line cousins and joint-venture partners will render them
irrelevant and march on. The terror syndicate is getting stronger
and more resourceful with every passing day. Forget the foreign funding
for a moment. The two main sources of funding of the terror network are
kidnapping and extortion. According to one unempirical estimate, on
average there are around one thousand kidnapped citizens held for ransom
in North Waziristan at any given time. The story of extortion is even
more alarming. All kinds of extortion rackets – some franchised by the
TTP and others just making hay while they can – are collecting money
from anyone who has the ability to pay. The state as we know is
unable to protect the life and property of citizens. Now if you could
pay off the TTP in return for a promise not to be harmed, wouldn’t that
be a rational choice for a businessman within the TTP’s firing range
(which now unfortunately extends across most of Pakistan)? And then the
TTP provides citizen services as well. If you have a house or land that
is under someone’s occupation, you can either engage with the crackling
justice system, grease your way through and wait for years as ‘due
process’ lingers on, or you can outsource the task to the TTP or its
local franchise and get instant results. In a functional state people
pay taxes in return for protection of their fundamental rights and
liberties and pay fees for provision of services. Is it not ironic that
prosperous businessmen of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan are forced to
pay jizya to the TTP to be left in peace? And is it not frightening
that some are willingly reaching out to these merchants of terror for
adjudication and resolution of private disputes? When the diktat of the
TTP becomes more effective than the writ of the state and when the
terror syndicate appears more resourceful than institutions of the
state, can there be a conclusion other than that the state is falling
apart? As the APC meets to discuss our terror problem, let Chatham
House rules apply. Let the security establishment share the scope and
magnitude of the problem with our representatives and let the anonymity
of those engaging in such debate be guaranteed. For if the ability of
our policymakers to formulate a rational policy on such a crucial issue
is sabotaged due to personal safety concerns, we’re already past the
tipping point. Email: sattar@post.harvard.edu |
0 comments:
Post a Comment