Monday, May 14, 2012

Prepare for what's coming.

This is what media and paid analysts will never tell you. Prepare for what's coming. The munafiqeen and the traitors are now exposed. Elections under these circumstances would mean a collective suicide. Reject and resist elections. All those calling for elections are either traitors or idiots. Patriotic caretakers must take over now.

BrassTacks Security security and political Review of the Week:

Eastern Front

India and US are now partners in war against Pakistan. Indians are aggressively buying US weapons and also leaning upon the diplomatic prowess of the US to encircle, isolate and then nail Pakistan. The pace of Indo-US cooperation in all spheres of diplomacy, economics, military and regional cooperation is breathtaking and indeed seriously threatening for Pakistan. The shapes of things to come are now crystal clear. The Af-Pak and Cold start have now joined hand against their common enemy – Pakistan.

India is now heavily counting upon the US to be appointed as the natural heir to the US/NATO in Afghanistan once the bulk of western forces leave the country in around 2014. Indian military and economic presence is heavy in Afghanistan which is also being used as a launch pad to wage the 4thGW against Pakistan to soften it up for Af-Pak and Cold Start invasions.

The blockade of NATO supplies has not just created a crisis for the Americans but also for the Indians as well. Now, every military plan of NATO and India has gone into complete disarray. This is a major strategic victory for Pakistan achieved through a master stroke of tactical brilliance.

If Pakistan can hold this blockade for another few months, the back of the US military adventure would be broken in Afghanistan and by default of India as well. Americans continue to provoke Pakistan with more and more drone strikes and the mood remains defiant in Pakistan army to resist the US pressure to open the supplies.

Incredibly, Pakistan government remains in blissful ignorance about the intentions, strategy, weapons acquisitions and diplomatic and media offensive of India against Pakistan and continue to insist upon trade, talks, peace and giving access to the Indians in Pakistani markets and society. The Indian psy-ops within Pakistan is now most intrusive and devastating. Indians are fully exploiting this intrinsic treachery of the government and are in no mood to give any concession to Pakistan, especially when US is standing alongside Delhi.

But Pakistan army is now seriously concerned. With 55% of the army already deployed on active duty on internal security operations, there are just not enough troops to respond if the Indians decide to launch their Cold Start doctrine. Pakistan’s reliance is now heavily on its unconventional forces which can carry nuclear payload. While the government continues to auction the national security, military prepares for the inevitable showdown.

On the western front, Pakistan continues to create serious crisis for US and NATO forces in Afghanistan. US is now desperate but is also extremely vulnerable to Pakistan’s strength in deciding the fate of US forces in Afghanistan. US cannot harm Pakistan militarily but the weak and compromised political leadership offers an opportunity to the US to threaten and blackmail the PPP regime. The regime is also hell bent upon opening NATO supplies but is afraid of the army and the public backlash. The PPP ministers are now resorting to shameless and farcical PR drive to convince the nation that NATO supplies must be restored, quoting non-existential laws and accords. US is also using threats, blackmail and intimidation to bring down the Pakistani resistance.

US is now fully using threat and blackmail to bring down Pakistani resistance. They have made their intentions clear on Drone strikes as well, making a mockery of the Pakistani parliaments’ resolution on the seriously contentious issue.

But the fact is that the relations between Pakistan and US have now hit rock bottom. US knows that it cannot impose another war on a nuclear armed nation with an army of over half a million regulars and over 10 million irregulars, tribals, militias and armed citizens. US have to use pressure, threats, bluffs, blackmails and bribes to make their way through not a real military adventure. This is the crisis US is facing right now. It does not have a military muscle to threaten Pakistan in real terms. US have to rely on bluffing Pakistan into submission. The entire invasion levels hardware is now stuck in Pakistan and if the things went out of control, Pakistan could actually seize these supplies which cannot be replaced by the US under any circumstances under the catastrophic economic meltdown in US and NATO countries.

US is threatening Pakistan that Islamabad would not be invited to a conference to decide the future of Afghanistan is Islamabad continues to block supplies. This is just another empty bluff which the PPP regime is more than willing to swallow. There is nothing US can do in Afghanistan without Pakistan’s support and any decision taken in the absence of Islamabad would mean nothing more than the piece of paper it is written. There is real threat that the PPP regime would auction the national interest rather too soon, without offering any resistance. The convicted PM is in London but keen to find a way out for the NATO forces at all cost.

There is a reason why US is using bluff and blackmail and not actual military force to bring down Pakistan. US just cannot afford another military conflict when it is losing the war in Afghanistan. In a damning indictment of US military strategy, a serving US army Colonel writes in the US armed forces journal about the debacles and disasters now haunting the occupation forces.

The article makes a startling read and shows how US is using the bluff and blackmail to confuse and disorientate the Pakistani leadership. Written by one of their finest officers who have spent time in Afghanistan, this article is the real factual analysis of the nightmare the US army is facing in Afghanistan and of failures of their leaders and allies in the Afghan army.

US cannot even control their allies, the Afghan army; let alone containing the rag tag militia of Taliban. Now the prospects of going to war with a nuclear armed nation with millions of regular and irregular fighters are a nightmarish unthinkable preposition for the US. US just cannot do it. This is what the Pakistani leaders do not understand.

US is actually releasing the Taliban fighters to cut peace deals with their “arch” enemy. This is farcical, hilarious and makes a mockery of their demands that Pakistan should “do more” to contain the Taliban threats. Such is the dire situation of the US in Afghanistan.
Political Front

The 4th generation war Pakistan is facing today cannot be fought without a strong stable government. The 4GW is not a military war alone but primarily a political, economic, media and diplomatic one. The fact is that 4GW cannot be deployed against a state if it has a strong federal government managing the law and order and economy as well the diplomacy and politics with strength and good governance. The fact that Pakistan is today on the verge of internal collapse is a sign that its government is actually a part of the problem instead of being its solution.

There is absolutely no sign of any reform, improvement or correction in any government or state organ and the collapse is too rapid now to be controlled without serious bloodshed and anarchy. The government, political parties, Supreme Court and the nation remain at war with each other oblivious to the threats which have now engulfed the nation. It is actually anarchy now.

The meltdown continues as parties literally drag the country towards a civil war on provincial or ethnic lines. This is most explosive political gamble by the parties to muster political support before the elections. The country would be ripped violently on ethnic lines. The Supreme Court continues to fire in every direction without any strategy or vision to control the rot, adding to the chaos exponentially.

While the state organs and political parties fight amongst each other, the country continues to slip rapidly into abyss as food and energy crisis turn into nightmares.

The rulers and political leaders are making windfall profits as the country burns on all axis. The members of the parliament, Ministers and the Prime Minister, all are now the richest people in a country where almost 90% suffer food or energy insecurity. This is scandalous now and all the ingredients of a massive violent street revolution are mixed into a volatile inferno.

The anarchy is now unsustainable. If the army does not move in now, the country would become a failed state like Somalia or a disintegrated state like Yugoslavia. It has now come to this. 


Truth, lies and Afghanistan
How military leaders have let us down
I spent last year in Afghanistan, visiting and talking with U.S. troops and their Afghan partners. My duties with the Army’s Rapid Equipping Force took me into every significant area where our soldiers engage the enemy. Over the course of 12 months, I covered more than 9,000 miles and talked, traveled and patrolled with troops in Kandahar, Kunar, Ghazni, Khost, Paktika, Kunduz, Balkh, Nangarhar and other provinces.What I saw bore no resemblance to rosy official statements by U.S. military leaders about conditions on the ground. 

Entering this deployment, I was sincerely hoping to learn that the claims were true: that conditions in Afghanistan were improving, that the local government and military were progressing toward self-sufficiency. I did not need to witness dramatic improvements to be reassured, but merely hoped to see evidence of positive trends, to see companies or battalions produce even minimal but sustainable progress.

Instead, I witnessed the absence of success on virtually every level.
My arrival in country in late 2010 marked the start of my fourth combat deployment, and my second in Afghanistan. A Regular Army officer in the Armor Branch, I served in Operation Desert Storm, in Afghanistan in 2005-06 and in Iraq in 2008-09. In the middle of my career, I spent eight years in the U.S. Army Reserve and held a number of civilian jobs — among them, legislative correspondent for defense and foreign affairs for Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison, R-Texas. 

As a representative for the Rapid Equipping Force, I set out to talk to our troops about their needs and their circumstances. Along the way, I conducted mounted and dismounted combat patrols, spending time with conventional and Special Forces troops. I interviewed or had conversations with more than 250 soldiers in the field, from the lowest-ranking 19-year-old private to division commanders and staff members at every echelon. I spoke at length with Afghan security officials, Afghan civilians and a few village elders. 

I saw the incredible difficulties any military force would have to pacify even a single area of any of those provinces; I heard many stories of how insurgents controlled virtually every piece of land beyond eyeshot of a U.S. or International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) base.
I saw little to no evidence the local governments were able to provide for the basic needs of the people. Some of the Afghan civilians I talked with said the people didn’t want to be connected to a predatory or incapable local government. From time to time, I observed Afghan Security forces collude with the insurgency.
From Bad to Abysmal 

Much of what I saw during my deployment, let alone read or wrote in official reports, I can’t talk about; the information remains classified. But I can say that such reports — mine and others’ — serve to illuminate the gulf between conditions on the ground and official statements of progress.
And I can relate a few representative experiences, of the kind that I observed all over the country.
In January 2011, I made my first trip into the mountains of Kunar province near the Pakistan border to visit the troops of 1st Squadron, 32nd Cavalry. On a patrol to the northernmost U.S. position in eastern Afghanistan, we arrived at an Afghan National Police (ANP) station that had reported being attacked by the Taliban 2½ hours earlier. 

Through the interpreter, I asked the police captain where the attack had originated, and he pointed to the side of a nearby mountain.
“What are your normal procedures in situations like these?” I asked. “Do you form up a squad and go after them? Do you periodically send out harassing patrols? What do you do?”
As the interpreter conveyed my questions, the captain’s head wheeled around, looking first at the interpreter and turning to me with an incredulous expression. Then he laughed.
“No! We don’t go after them,” he said. “That would be dangerous!”
According to the cavalry troopers, the Afghan policemen rarely leave the cover of the checkpoints. In that part of the province, the Taliban literally run free. 

In June, I was in the Zharay district of Kandahar province, returning to a base from a dismounted patrol. Gunshots were audible as the Taliban attacked a U.S. checkpoint about one mile away.
As I entered the unit’s command post, the commander and his staff were watching a live video feed of the battle. Two ANP vehicles were blocking the main road leading to the site of the attack. The fire was coming from behind a haystack. We watched as two Afghan men emerged, mounted a motorcycle and began moving toward the Afghan policemen in their vehicles. 

The U.S. commander turned around and told the Afghan radio operator to make sure the policemen halted the men. The radio operator shouted into the radio repeatedly, but got no answer.
On the screen, we watched as the two men slowly motored past the ANP vehicles. The policemen neither got out to stop the two men nor answered the radio — until the motorcycle was out of sight.
To a man, the U.S. officers in that unit told me they had nothing but contempt for the Afghan troops in their area — and that was before the above incident occurred. 

In August, I went on a dismounted patrol with troops in the Panjwai district of Kandahar province. Several troops from the unit had recently been killed in action, one of whom was a very popular and experienced soldier. One of the unit’s senior officers rhetorically asked me, “How do I look these men in the eye and ask them to go out day after day on these missions? What’s harder: How do I look [my soldier’s] wife in the eye when I get back and tell her that her husband died for something meaningful? How do I do that?” 

One of the senior enlisted leaders added, “Guys are saying, ‘I hope I live so I can at least get home to R&R leave before I get it,’ or ‘I hope I only lose a foot.’ Sometimes they even say which limb it might be: ‘Maybe it’ll only be my left foot.’ They don’t have a lot of confidence that the leadership two levels up really understands what they’re living here, what the situation really is.” 

On Sept. 11, the 10th anniversary of the infamous attack on the U.S., I visited another unit in Kunar province, this one near the town of Asmar. I talked with the local official who served as the cultural adviser to the U.S. commander. Here’s how the conversation went:
Davis: “Here you have many units of the Afghan National Security Forces [ANSF]. Will they be able to hold out against the Taliban when U.S. troops leave this area?”
Adviser: “No. They are definitely not capable. Already all across this region [many elements of] the security forces have made deals with the Taliban. [The ANSF] won’t shoot at the Taliban, and the Taliban won’t shoot them. 

“Also, when a Taliban member is arrested, he is soon released with no action taken against him. So when the Taliban returns [when the Americans leave after 2014], so too go the jobs, especially for everyone like me who has worked with the coalition. 

“Recently, I got a cellphone call from a Talib who had captured a friend of mine. While I could hear, he began to beat him, telling me I’d better quit working for the Americans. I could hear my friend crying out in pain. [The Talib] said the next time they would kidnap my sons and do the same to them. Because of the direct threats, I’ve had to take my children out of school just to keep them safe.
“And last night, right on that mountain there [he pointed to a ridge overlooking the U.S. base, about 700 meters distant], a member of the ANP was murdered. The Taliban came and called him out, kidnapped him in front of his parents, and took him away and murdered him. He was a member of the ANP from another province and had come back to visit his parents. He was only 27 years old. The people are not safe anywhere.” 

That murder took place within view of the U.S. base, a post nominally responsible for the security of an area of hundreds of square kilometers. Imagine how insecure the population is beyond visual range. And yet that conversation was representative of what I saw in many regions of Afghanistan.
In all of the places I visited, the tactical situation was bad to abysmal. If the events I have described — and many, many more I could mention — had been in the first year of war, or even the third or fourth, one might be willing to believe that Afghanistan was just a hard fight, and we should stick it out. Yet these incidents all happened in the 10th year of war. 

As the numbers depicting casualties and enemy violence indicate the absence of progress, so too did my observations of the tactical situation all over Afghanistan.
Credibility Gap
I’m hardly the only one who has noted the discrepancy between official statements and the truth on the ground. 

A January 2011 report by the Afghan NGO Security Office noted that public statements made by U.S. and ISAF leaders at the end of 2010 were “sharply divergent from IMF, [international military forces, NGO-speak for ISAF] ‘strategic communication’ messages suggesting improvements. We encourage [nongovernment organization personnel] to recognize that no matter how authoritative the source of any such claim, messages of the nature are solely intended to influence American and European public opinion ahead of the withdrawal, and are not intended to offer an accurate portrayal of the situation for those who live and work here.” 

The following month, Anthony Cordesman, on behalf of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, wrote that ISAF and the U.S. leadership failed to report accurately on the reality of the situation in Afghanistan. 

“Since June 2010, the unclassified reporting the U.S. does provide has steadily shrunk in content, effectively ‘spinning’ the road to victory by eliminating content that illustrates the full scale of the challenges ahead,” Cordesman wrote. “They also, however, were driven by political decisions to ignore or understate Taliban and insurgent gains from 2002 to 2009, to ignore the problems caused by weak and corrupt Afghan governance, to understate the risks posed by sanctuaries in Pakistan, and to ‘spin’ the value of tactical ISAF victories while ignoring the steady growth of Taliban influence and control.” 

How many more men must die in support of a mission that is not succeeding and behind an array of more than seven years of optimistic statements by U.S. senior leaders in Afghanistan? No one expects our leaders to always have a successful plan. But we do expect — and the men who do the living, fighting and dying deserve — to have our leaders tell us the truth about what’s going on.
I first encountered senior-level equivocation during a 1997 division-level “experiment” that turned out to be far more setpiece than experiment. Over dinner at Fort Hood, Texas, Training and Doctrine Command leaders told me that the Advanced Warfighter Experiment (AWE) had shown that a “digital division” with fewer troops and more gear could be far more effective than current divisions. The next day, our congressional staff delegation observed the demonstration firsthand, and it didn’t take long to realize there was little substance to the claims. 

Virtually no legitimate experimentation was actually conducted. All parameters were carefully scripted. All events had a preordained sequence and outcome. The AWE was simply an expensive show, couched in the language of scientific experimentation and presented in glowing press releases and public statements, intended to persuade Congress to fund the Army’s preference. Citing the AWE’s “results,” Army leaders proceeded to eliminate one maneuver company per combat battalion. But the loss of fighting systems was never offset by a commensurate rise in killing capability. 

A decade later, in the summer of 2007, I was assigned to the Future Combat Systems (FCS) organization at Fort Bliss, Texas. It didn’t take long to discover that the same thing the Army had done with a single division at Fort Hood in 1997 was now being done on a significantly larger scale with FCS. Year after year, the congressionally mandated reports from the Government Accountability Office revealed significant problems and warned that the system was in danger of failing. Each year, the Army’s senior leaders told members of Congress at hearings that GAO didn’t really understand the full picture and that to the contrary, the program was on schedule, on budget, and headed for success. Ultimately, of course, the program was canceled, with little but spinoffs to show for $18 billion spent. 

If Americans were able to compare the public statements many of our leaders have made with classified data, this credibility gulf would be immediately observable. Naturally, I am not authorized to divulge classified material to the public. But I am legally able to share it with members of Congress. I have accordingly provided a much fuller accounting in a classified report to several members of Congress, both Democrats and Republicans, senators and House members. 


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